Even if electronic warfare systems jam the “Shahed” 25 kilometers before it reaches its target, a drone equipped with high-quality inertial navigation will deviate from its course by only about 250 meters. Therefore, the electronic warfare umbrella over Kyiv is capable of protecting individual targets, but not the entire capital.

RBC-Ukraine reported this, citing Tymofii Yurkov, co-founder of Contra-Drone, according to Dengi.ua.

How the Electronic Warfare Dome Over Kyiv Works

The electronic warfare system around the capital was deployed over a year ago. Since then, “Shaheds” have been equipped with CRPA antennas featuring an increasing number of modules, meaning more electronic warfare assets are needed to counter them. The dome is constantly being upgraded: over the past year, the number of such systems around Kyiv has more than tripled. The system is effective against jet-powered “Shaheds,” missiles, and any weapon that uses satellite navigation to guide its strike.

To What Extent Does Electronic Warfare Throw the “Shahed” Off Course?

Despite the upgrades, the dome is not a universal defense. Under the influence of electronic warfare, the drone’s navigation system does not shut down completely but begins to operate with an error margin that gradually increases. If a “Shahed” equipped with a high-quality inertial navigation system is jammed, for example, 25 kilometers from the target, its deviation will be about 1%. That’s roughly 10 meters for every kilometer of flight, or about 250 meters over the entire distance.

Why the Dome Is No Guarantee of Safety for the City

In practice, such a deviation means that a drone flying toward a bridge will fall into the water, while one intended to strike a substation might hit a residential building. This is precisely why the dome protects specific targets, while the city itself remains at risk.

What Is Needed to Prevent “Shaheds” From Reaching Kyiv

For effective protection, it is necessary to establish several layers of defense around Kyiv and in the surrounding region and to counter the “Shahed” with electronic warfare (EW) measures starting from Russian territory. With this approach, the margin of error will increase to 2–3 kilometers, and the drone will not reach the city. It will crash nearby, in a forest or, in the worst-case scenario, in some populated area—but not in Kyiv and not on a high-rise building.