For decades, Russia maintained a dominant position in the Central Asian arms market. However, in recent years, the situation has begun to change. China, which has long been viewed primarily as an important trade and economic partner in the region, is increasingly expanding its presence in the defense sector. Beijing supplies Central Asian countries with drones, armored vehicles, transport aircraft, and air defense systems, and is also involved in the construction of border security facilities and the training of specialists. This was reported by Dengi.ua, citing The Caspian Post.
Uzbekistan is currently considered one of the most notable examples. In July-August 2026, specialized publications and OSINT analysts reported on the possible delivery of Chinese Chengdu J-10CE fighter jets to Tashkent. According to these reports, Uzbekistan could have received four aircraft, while the potential contract allegedly calls for the delivery of up to 24 aircraft. However, no official confirmation has yet been provided by either Tashkent or Beijing, so it is premature to consider the deal a done deal.
Nevertheless, the very possibility of the J-10CE joining the Uzbek Air Force is of significant importance. It demonstrates just how much the region’s arms market has changed: Russia no longer holds a virtually unrivaled position here, as it did in the first decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
China Has Been Gradually Expanding its Presence
Central Asian countries’ shift toward different suppliers began long before 2026. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow held a significant advantage because local armies continued to use Soviet MiG-29s, Su-27s, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, T-72 tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and Russian air defense systems.
Transitioning to equipment from other sources requires significant resources. Acquiring a new combat aircraft, for example, means having to train pilots and technical personnel, establish new maintenance facilities, procure appropriate ammunition, and overhaul supply chains. It was precisely this compatibility with the existing system that allowed Russia to maintain its position for such a long time.
However, countries in the region have gradually begun to seek alternative suppliers. China has emerged as one of the main contenders to fill the void.
Uzbekistan
China’s military-technical cooperation with Uzbekistan began long before reports of possible J-10CE deliveries. As early as the first half of the 2010s, Tashkent had shown interest in the Chinese Wing Loong attack drones.
Later, the cooperation expanded to a significantly more complex segment - air defense. Uzbekistan received the Chinese FD-2000 surface-to-air missile system, the export variant of the HQ-9. Open sources have also mentioned other Chinese air defense systems in service with the country. Experts view the delivery of the FD-2000 as one of the most telling examples of the expansion of China’s presence in Uzbekistan’s defense sector.
The significance of such deliveries extends far beyond the mere acquisition of individual pieces of equipment. A modern air defense system includes radars, command posts, missiles, communications equipment, trained personnel, and ongoing technical maintenance. Thus, China has gradually gained access to key elements of Uzbekistan’s military infrastructure.
If reports of the J-10CE purchase are confirmed, this would mark a new level of cooperation. Operating modern fighter jets requires long-term procurement of weapons and spare parts, engine maintenance, software updates, equipment upgrades, and pilot training. Therefore, a potential contract could shape Uzbekistan’s relations with China for decades to come.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan remains one of the Central Asian states most closely tied to Russia in military and political terms. The country is a member of the CSTO, continues to use a significant amount of Soviet and Russian equipment, and its military cooperation with Moscow remains extensive.
At the same time, Astana has been developing relations with the Chinese defense industry for quite some time. In particular, Kazakhstan’s security forces have received Wing Loong-1 drones and Y-8F-200 military transport aircraft.
In 2018, Kazakhstan and the Shaanxi Aircraft Corporation signed a contract for eight Y-8F-200W aircraft. The first of these was delivered that same year, after which further fulfillment of the contract began.
Turkmenistan
Another example of a significant Chinese presence is Turkmenistan. Ashgabat began acquiring Chinese air defense systems even before such purchases became common practice in the region.
According to publicly available data, Turkmenistan has purchased HQ-9 long-range systems, HQ-12 medium-range systems, and various radar and anti-aircraft systems. The Wilson Center estimates that the value of the 2016 contract, which included the HQ-9 and HQ-12, at approximately $230 million. In addition, the Turkmen armed forces have demonstrated Chinese drones, including the CH-3A.
China’s role in the field of air defense is particularly important, as this component is directly linked to the protection of the country’s airspace. By acquiring such systems, the country simultaneously forges long-term technological ties with the supplier nation.
Therefore, China’s presence in Turkmenistan indicates that the decline of Russian dominance began even before Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.
Tajikistan
In Tajikistan, China’s strategy takes on a somewhat different character. According to the Carnegie Endowment, more than 90% of the weapons received by Tajikistan since gaining independence were sourced from Russia.
However, Beijing is gradually strengthening its position in certain areas. The Tajik armed forces have received Chinese Norinco VP11 armored vehicles, CS/VN3 light armored vehicles, Tiger armored cars, self-propelled mortar systems, and small arms. Some of these vehicles were displayed at military parades in Dushanbe.
An even more important priority has been ensuring security along the border with Afghanistan. China has funded the construction and development of relevant infrastructure in Tajikistan. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) research has reported a Chinese presence in the Wakhan Corridor area and at facilities in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. However, their exact status remains a matter of varying interpretations, so it is incorrect to unequivocally label them as Chinese military bases.
As a result, Beijing is gradually becoming for Dushanbe not merely a supplier of equipment, but also a participant in the border security system. For China, security in this region is of direct importance due to the risks associated with instability in Afghanistan, security in Xinjiang, investments, and transportation routes in Central Asia.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan still lags significantly behind its neighbors in terms of the scale of its purchases of modern Chinese military equipment. Russia retains significant influence there, in part thanks to the Kant Air Base.
Nevertheless, Beijing has been providing Bishkek with military-technical and security assistance for many years. China has supplied vehicles, communications equipment, and other resources to the military and law enforcement agencies, and has also participated in the training of Kyrgyz specialists.
According to the Carnegie Endowment, following the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China began regularly providing Kyrgyzstan with assistance in the military and security sectors.
Individual deliveries cannot be compared in scale to contracts for modern fighter jets or air defense systems. However, they are forging lasting institutional ties between China and Kyrgyzstan’s security forces, which in the long run may prove no less significant than direct arms sales.
Russia’s Position Is Weakening
When considering all five Central Asian countries together, it becomes clear that Chinese influence spans virtually all key areas of defense.
In Kazakhstan, China supplies drones and transport aircraft. In Uzbekistan, it has already established a foothold in the unmanned aerial vehicle and air defense sectors and now has the potential to enter the fighter jet market. Turkmenistan uses Chinese air defense systems, radars, and drones. In Tajikistan, Beijing is represented by armored vehicles, border infrastructure, and security programs. Kyrgyzstan receives military aid, equipment, and personnel training.
An additional factor has been Russia’s war against Ukraine, which has accelerated changes that were already underway. Russian arms exports have declined significantly. According to SIPRI, exports of major Russian weapon systems in 2021–2025 were 64% lower than in 2016–2020. At the same time, Russia’s share of global arms exports fell from 21% to 6.8%.
The Russian defense industry is simultaneously under pressure from the needs of its own military and sanctions restrictions that hinder access to technology and components.
For foreign buyers, this raises additional questions regarding production and delivery timelines, equipment availability, repairs, and ongoing maintenance. China now has the opportunity to capitalize on this uncertainty to expand its own exports.
China Is No Longer Perceived Solely as a Cheap Supplier
Technological progress has become another advantage for Beijing. While two decades ago Chinese systems were often viewed as cheaper alternatives to Russian or Western weapons, today this perception no longer reflects the reality.
Chinese industry produces modern combat aircraft, long-range air defense systems, missiles, armed drones, armored vehicles, and advanced radar systems. According to SIPRI, China ranks among the world’s top five exporters of major weapons systems.
The economic factor is also significant. China is already one of the largest trading partners of all five Central Asian states. For example, according to Uzbekistan, trade between China and Uzbekistan amounted to approximately $7.7 billion in the first half of 2026 alone.
Thus, military-technical contracts are becoming part of a much broader economic and strategic relationship.
This poses a serious challenge for Russia. For many years, there was a conventional model in which China was perceived primarily as an economic power, while Russia was seen as the key player in the security sphere. Now this distinction is gradually disappearing.
China remains Moscow’s largest economic competitor in the region, but at the same time is becoming increasingly active in the defense sector. Therefore, the question is no longer whether Beijing is capable of competing with Russia in the Central Asian arms market. This competition has already become a reality. The main question is how far this competition will go over the next decade.
